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Abstract  
The authors have analysed the economic growth and its determining factors in countries of the European Union, 
particularly in Hungary and Ukraine. We applied quantitative methods by analysing topic related database. We 
have found that the Central-Eastern European Periphery has not finished its transition, and this change is heading 
in the direction of the Southern Periphery of the European Union. As the Southern Periphery is the area of 
economic crises right now, it is obvious that something should be done in order to avoid falling to the same fate 
for the Central-Eastern European Periphery. The authors introduced a new production function and with its help 
they identified the bottlenecks of growth in Hungary and Ukraine, namely the organizational and human capital 
that in its present development stage, do not correspond to the needs of creating state of the art larger companies. 
The present crisis pushes both countries to postpone long-term developments, such as investments into human 
capital, and in this way makes the solution of the crisis more difficult.  
Keywords: Intellectual Capital, Growth, Southern European Periphery, Central-Eastern European Periphery, 
Enterprise Demography, Competitiveness 
 
1. Introduction 
Two decades have passed since the transition from centrally planned economies into market economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe began. Experiencing our everyday economic difficulties, the public opinion is 
inclined to evaluate this transition period as unsuccessful. This is dangerous, because it does not take into proper 
account the significant development that has been achieved and instead of completing the achieved half results 
the prevailing pessimism could everything destroy what we have positively done. At the same time it must be 
acknowledged that something went wrong and patience alone is not enough to be successful. 
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The central message of the study is that we are behind a painful, but unavoidable structural change that in many 
respects has corrected the former distorted development and the achieved one mostly corresponds to the present 
economic development level of our countries. However we cannot be satisfied with the evolved status quo. To 
get a positive balance we must continue the transition and we must make further investments, especially there, 
where our weakest point is, into our knowledge capital. 
 
This statement is somewhat of a paradox. The Central and Eastern European countries are not wrong in 
knowledge indicators. Their education system, their scientific life each stands in international comparison; 
notwithstanding, it does not appear in their economic performance. In this article we try to find some facts that 
could partially explain this paradox. 
 
There is one phenomenon that makes the picture more complex and more difficult to explain: the present 
worldwide economic crisis that erupted in 2008. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the main bottlenecks that 
are restraining our growth are not of short-term character. So, in this study, we will focus on those long-term 
factors that already worked prior to the present world crisis and which will determine our development in the 
future when the crisis is over. The present crisis only magnifies the difficulties that are the result of those 
determining factors that we will reveal.  
 
The structure of our article is the following: first we will describe the growth that has evolved during the 
transition; then we will summarize those factors that determine the growth; next we will examine those factors in 
detail, which we regard as bottlenecks of our growth; after that we will analyse those structural changes that can 
dissolve these bottlenecks and finally solve our paradox. In our analysis we will focus mainly on Hungary and 
Ukraine, but we will try to generalize the results obtained this way for all of Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
2. The European growth 
Economic growth could be measured in many ways, but we will apply the traditional GDP based measurement, 
even though we are well aware of its shortages. We accept the message of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi report, i.e. 
GDP growth reflects acceptable growth only, if the resulting assets are grown at a sustainable way. (Stiglitz-Sen-
Fitoussi [2009]) In addition to GDP measurements we rely on WEF and IMD competitiveness data to overcome 
the above-mentioned imperfection of GDP data. 
 
To get an overview about the European Growth we aggregated the EU countries into four country groups and 
compiled a non EU country group of Russia, Ukraine and Serbia. The growth of these country groups are shown 
on Figure 1. 
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Figure 1.: The real GDP of the main European country groups at 2000 constant prices 
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Source: Authors’ calculation from AMECO and World Bank databases. Other central countries: Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Ireland, UK; Net contributors 1 : Austria, Finland, Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands, 
Sweden; Southern Peripheral countries: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain; Central-Eastern European 
countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, and the Baltic 
states. 
Since the magnitude of the compared aggregates is very different, instead of an arithmetical scale on the vertical 
axis, we used a logarithmic scale. The logarithmic scale not only shows the different aggregates in a comparable 
way, but also makes their growth comparable. The slope of the curves in a given period is rather constant and is 
proportional to the average growth of those years. The figures above the curves indicate the exact average 
growth rate of that period. Important restriction: in this study we do not deal with the last decline due to the 
world financial crisis in 2008 that is observable in each curve. 
 
There are some very characteristic tendencies in the European Growth. If we disregard the present economic 
crisis, whose general outcome we do not yet know, we will witness a long-term growth scissor: the net 
contributors and the other central countries had a relatively quick, 2,5 percentage average growth, while the 
growth of the peripheral countries gradually slowed down. This delay was relatively gradual in the countries of 
the Southern European Periphery, while in countries of Central-Eastern European periphery it was rather 
dramatic and accompanied by a transition from the centrally planned economic system into a market economy2. 
In the focus of our research we shall concentrate on the growth of the later country group in a more detailed 
manner.  
 
3. The Hungarian and Ukrainian growth 
The Central and Eastern European growth can be well characterized by the description of the Hungarian and the 
Ukrainian growth. 
 
                                                 
1
 These countries are the most advanced in the European Union and they are quasi cross-financing the southern EU countries and the 
central-eastern countries. 
 
2
 There is a slow down in the growth rate of the net contributors as well, but it is a consequence of the German reunification. If there were 
no reunification, the growth rate of this country group would have remained around 2.5 percentage averagely instead of 1.8. 
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Figure 2.: The real GDP and its growth rates in the net contributor countries, Hungary and Ukraine 
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Source: Authors’ calculation from AMECO and World Bank databases 
 
As one can see on Figure 2, from 1960 to 2008 the real GDP of the net contributor countries – if we disregard 
statistics from the German reunification effect – was steadily growing while Hungary’s and Ukraine’s GDP had 
some ups and downs.  
 
Until the 1973 oil crises Hungary had a very significant growth. The annual growth rate in Hungary was around 
5,4%3 and the rate in the net contributor countries was roughly 4,5%. After the oil crises the growth slowed 
down to 2,4% in the net contributor countries and to 1,4% in Hungary. The large, unbearable difference was the 
consequence of the inefficient centrally planned economic system that had to be changed into the market 
economy. The transition brought some changes, but did not significantly change the scissor. In Hungary the 
growth at first plummeted into a significant decline, as the economic systems transition begun, but after the 
recovery from it in 2005, only the previous 1,4% rate was restored. 
 
The Ukrainian curve in many aspects follows the same path that the Hungarian curve followed, i.e. the pre-crisis 
development was also broken by a deep transition crisis and after that a quick reconstruction period was begun 
with significant acceleration of growth. The required time for the reconstruction seems to be longer in Ukraine. 
Hungary had 4 years of decline, and Ukraine required about 10 years. Hungary needed 10 years to restore to its 
previous growth and Ukraine likely would have needed more time, but the Ukrainian reconstruction phase was 
disturbed by the 2008 world financial crisis and therefore it is difficult to guess when the Ukrainian 
reconstruction phase would have ended. It is even more difficult to forecast exactly how the long-term trend of 
Ukraine will be restored. The 3 percentage average growth rate before 1989 was very high, higher than that of 
the most developed countries. First one must check whether this rate was real and sustainable; only after having 
done that could someone dare to predict anything for the future. 
 
4. The Central and Eastern European growth 
The transition itself is not yet successful in many post-socialist countries. Currently there are 3 scenarios as can 
be seen in Figure 3. 
                                                 
3
 Although Hüttl (2011) states that the Hungarian GDP growth are overstated from the socialist times. (Hüttl (2011)) 
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Figure 3.: Transition scenarios of post-socialist countries 
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Source: Authors’ calculation from Hungarian Statistical Office, AMECO and World Bank databases with the 
methodology of Jánossy (1975)  
 
There are the countries that could accelerate their former long-term GDP growth – Poland, Slovenia and Serbia 
or the accelerator countries. These countries experienced only a minor transitional decline, they have restored 
the decline already, and they could even accelerate their growth. The ratekeeper countries had a completely 
different scenario, as their transitional decline was significant – what they could restore, but they could not yet 
accelerate their long-term growth. These countries are Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia. The third group 
of countries are the restorers, who had a major transitional decline, which they have not yet restored and as we 
do not have the information as to when they will restore it and it is unknown whether they can accelerate their 
growth or not. 
 
Regardless, if we accept the assumption that the better economic performance measured in larger GDP means a 
better life, we should tackle the issue of how to fall in line with the net contributor and other central countries. In 
the beginning of the transition the post-socialist countries had high hopes of closing up, but most of their hopes 
were dashed. The transition did not meet their expectations and the net contributors are now cruising away. We 
should analyze the reasons behind the not so successful transition to gain some insight as to why the growth 
failed to accelerate and whether there are some bottlenecks that could be treated to help in a leap to a better 
growth course. 
 
5. The production factors behind the growth 
These economic trends raise two very important questions:  
• What really determines the new value of creation?  
• Where should we intervene to avoid further crisis in the Central European Periphery? 
To answer these questions we rely on a new production function illustrated in figure 4. 
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Figure 4: The new production function 
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New value cannot be produced without assets or capital! To produce new value we need real estates, buildings, 
machines, equipments, working capital, etc. Let us call this group of assets the tangible production factors. 
Then we shall denote this group of assets by T. However, these assets only represent a fragment of those 
production factors that are needed for a successful value creation. What kinds of production factors are still 
required? 
 
First we need relationship assets or capital. Here the asset side refers to our customers, brand, and suppliers. 
Investments are required in order to have reliable and working relations with our customers, with the authorities 
and organisations in our environment, and with society. For that system of relationships to occur, somebody 
must invest. This way an asset will be created and it will be owned by the investor. This asset works exactly as 
the tangible assets do. Henceforth this asset group, our relationships or our customers, will be denoted by I1E. 
The denotation shows that these assets do not have material forms, they are immaterial assets; therefore is the 
letter I used. The letter E as an upper case letter indicates their external content. Namely these assets are ours, 
but are carried by people outside of our domain (physical or psychic). The meaning of the under case index 1 
will be explained later. 
 
In order to produce new value we need strategy, know-how, databases, well-organized working processes, 
organization structures, values, and expected norms, i.e. organisational assets or capital. This also is an asset 
that requires investment from somebody, i.e. it is a capital of somebody. This asset group, our being organized, 
we shall denote by I1I. The upper case I expresses the internal character of these assets. These assets do not 
belong to those we would like to sell our products and services to, but to us. 
 
Each of the listed assets – T, I1E, I1I –- can be owned unambiguously. The ownership rights are transferable, 
sellable, and can be determined. This common characteristic is denoted by the under case index 1.  
 
However, this is not the case with the further assets that are also needed. The further assets that we also need are 
personal knowledge (I2K), skill (I2S), and engagement (motivation - I2M). These assets we shall call as human 
assets. When denoting them, I indicates that they are all immaterial, K means personal knowledge, S means skill 
and M means engagements (motivation). Here the under case index is 2. It indicates an essential difference. It 
indicates the fact that, these particular assets, can only be owned by the human beings who carry them. The K, S, 
and M are each strictly bound to the physical body of the owners. At the same time these asset items could be 
less dependent from each other. Somebody can have personal knowledge without also having serious skill. It is 
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also possible that something destroys someone’s motivation, although he still has both the personal knowledge 
and the skill. These elements are the product of different investments that are done by different actors. The 
investor may be the firm, or the carrying person, or the society. The ownership right of the investment is given to 
whoever the investor is, it is non-transferable and it is under the control of the carrying individual.  
 
N denotes those assets that cannot be identified exactly, because we do not know precisely how they work or 
what kind of nature they have; so these are the non-identified elements. At the same time they could be very 
coincidental in a certain production situation in which the social capital elements mainly belong. These factors 
are necessary in grasping the totality. 
 
With the help of Figure 1 we can further define the asset/capital items. Elements T-I1E-I1I together create the 
enterprise assets / enterprise capital. Elements I2K-I2S-I2M-L together create the human assets / human 
capital. As one can see, the human assets are not equal to the headcount, but to the headcount plus the 
knowledge assets / knowledge capital carried by it. Where the human capital is significant, the carrier is also 
beyond its flesh and blood nature, carrying a significant amount of knowledge capital. In this case, for the 
carrier, the wage is not enough. The carrier, as capital owner, would like to have the appropriate share from the 
produced new value as capital income; the larger the role of human capital, the grander the role of the 
distribution of the produced new value. In other words, the wages must shift to capital incomes. These laws are 
denoted by the arrows starting from the eclipse of income distribution.  
 
Finally, let us define the knowledge assets / knowledge capital, as the sum of the immaterial asset / immaterial 
capital elements. This is the item that we will call intellectual capital. 
 
The production function on Figure 1 has a serious background. Its scientific origins are rooted in the Cobb-
Douglas production function of literature and in its renewal by Solow and others.4 Additionally, it also has a 
serious practical background. This function has been tested in several enterprise projects. The experience of this 
testing has led to the second equation that also can be seen at the bottom on Figure 1. During our enterprise 
testing we had to come to the conclusion that the factors in the above production factors are not independent. 
Among them serious interrelationships exist and the new value production declines if these additional 
interrelationships are hurt. This second equation is the H = F2 (E) equation. It says that maximal new value can 
be produced only, if H corresponds in both magnitude and structure to requirements defined by E. If the real 
human capital is smaller or greater than the technically required one, then the new value is below the 
optimal value. If people of inadequate competency, skill, motivation, and number produce a product or a 
service, then either the cost level of production increases or, for quality problems, the turnover declines. Both are 
currently leading to the decrease of new value. This point will be crucial to solve our paradox later.  
 
There is still one factor we must speak about – innovation. Innovation literature and the vastly used innovation 
manuals differentiate among product innovation, process innovation, and many other kinds of innovation. 
According to our opinion, the innovation is equal to the change that increases the efficiency of one or several 
production factors. This can happen if an employer increases the efficiency of the production factors that are 
under her or his control alone. The innovation spark is ignited when a company with a new combination of the 
elements of the enterprise and human capital increases the total efficiency of the production factors; from the 
enterprise and national economy viewpoint, the latter is more important. In our view, the most likely place 
where the innovation may evolve is the organizational capital. However, it is not the only place where it 
could evolve and therefore we never would regard it as a separate production factor. Nevertheless, although the 
innovation can be sparked at every production factor, its impact must have its footprint on the organization 
capital, i.e. on internal immaterial assets, because it determines the final combination of assets as a result of 
successful innovation. To inspire innovation one needs a huge amount of common knowledge, more common 
work, a receptive environment, and a big dose of coincidence. All these will come together in the internal 
structure, i.e. within the internal immaterial assets. 
 
                                                 
4
 About the origins see the summary in the world bank edition (Aubert, 2010). Also an important summary can be found at Pirjo Ståhle and 
Sten Ståhle: We regard their research as one of the most advanced proceedings the famous Skandia school has developed under the 
supervision of its big guru, Leif Edvinsson. we regard ourselves also as followers of this famous school. 
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The economic development is like a caravan in the fact that its speed is determined by the slowest camel 
(Jánossy 1971; 1975). We have identified the “camels of the caravan” with the new production function and the 
“caravan” which can be seen in figure 5. The slowest camel actually means the bottleneck(s) of growth. 
 
 Figure 5. The bottlenecks of the Central and Eastern European development 
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What would a caravan owner do if he were unsatisfied with the speed of his caravan? He would change the 
slowest camel of course! The problem with this solution is that the camels are not equally changeable. The 
changeable and so replaceable camels are equivalent with the tangible and relationship assets. By the way, the 
Central and Eastern European countries have changed the majority of their tangible assets and markets. The 
personal knowledge, the skill, and the headcount are each partially replaceable on the enterprise level, but not 
replaceable on the national level. The organizational capital (organizations, institutions, etc.) is only partly 
replaceable, because it is seriously interrelated with the human capital. Motivation can be influenced on the short 
run, but not on the long run. Based on these characteristics it is obvious that the weakest points of the caravan are 
the non-replaceable or the partly replaceable production factors, i.e. the organizational capital and the human 
capital. 
 
According to our hypothesis in the development of central and eastern European countries, there are two major 
bottlenecks, i.e. the internal immaterial assets and the personal knowledge and the skills nowadays. Within the 
internal immaterial assets however, the management capabilities and the strategic partnerships are not utilized 
enough. The personal knowledge and skills are more problematic. Although, in the transitional countries, the 
education system has changed a lot, these changes have not yet met the criteria of the long-term needs of these 
countries. The skills and knowledge have both adapted to the requirements of multinational companies, but it 
seems they have failed to create any cutting edge in creating new industries or establishing new domestic 
multinational companies. 
 
6. The production factors in Hungary and in Ukraine 
As we mentioned earlier, the GDP does not express everything. Therefore, we completed the GDP analysis with 
an analysis of the WEF and IMD measurements.  
 
The rank of Ukraine in 2011-2012 Global Competitiveness Index rankings, computed by World Economic 
Forum (WEF), is 82 with a score of 4.00. It’s important to note that it is currently 7 points better then the last 
years ranking which is considered great progress after the steep decline of many countries. By using the WEF 
methodology behind the rapidly increasing Ukrainian GDP, we can see the well-educated population, flexible 
and efficient labour markets, large market size as Ukraine’s competitive strength and base for future growth 
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performance (Figure 6). However, weak institutional framework (131st place), highly inefficient market for 
goods and services (129th), and undeveloped financial sectors (116th) were not improved regardless of declared 
reforms and caused the weak position of Ukraine in this ranking.  
 
 
Figure 6. Global Competitiveness Index 2011-2012 of Hungary and Ukraine 
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Source: WEF (2012) 
For comparison, Hungary is ranked at 48 with score 4.36. In 2010-2011, Hungary’s GCI5 rank was 52, so the 
country improved its position by 4 points during the last year (WEF, 2012). We’d like to stress that Hungary’s 
competitive strong factors are almost the same as Ukrainian ones – health and primary education, higher 
education and training, and macroeconomic stability. So, both countries are competitive in terms of human 
capital development factors according to the WEF Global Competitiveness Index. At the same time, the weakest 
factors are almost the same for both Hungary and Ukraine: institutions, financial market sophistication, business 
sophistication, and innovation (see the bright gray cells, in table 1., where both county is good compared to their 
scores, and the dark grey cells in table 1., where both countries are weak compared to their scores). 
                                                 
5
 Global Competitiveness Index 
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Table 1.:Hungary’s and Ukraine’s performance in the WEF measurements 
 
Hungary Ukraine Hungary Ukraine
Institutions 3,8 3 -0,56 -1,00 
Infrastructure 4,5 3,9 0,14 -0,10 
Macroeconomic stability 4,8 4,3 0,44 0,30
Health and primary education 5,8 5,6 1,44 1,60
Higher education and training 4,7 4,6 0,34 0,60
Goods market and efficiency 4,3 3,6 -0,06 -0,40 
Labor market efficiency 4,4 4,4 0,04 0,40
Financial market sophistication 4,1 3,4 -0,26 -0,60 
Technological readiness 4,6 3,5 0,24 -0,50 
Market size 4,2 4,5 -0,16 0,50
Business sophistication 3,9 3,5 -0,46 -0,50 
Innovation 3,6 3,1 -0,76 -0,90 
Score 4,36 4
Pilar values
Deviation form 
score
 
 
 
So according to WEB measurements both countries are relatively strong in human capital related factors 
while relatively weak in organizational knowledge capital related factors.  
 
Table 2. Competitiveness Indicators Rankings of Hungary and Ukraine in 2007-2011 
Country Indicators Rank  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
 
HUNGARY 
Overall Competitiveness 35 38 45 42 47 
Economic Performance 38 39 33 40 44 
Government Efficiency 40 47 50 51 52 
Business Efficiency 41 45 52 47 50 
Infrastructure 25 27 33 35 35 
 
 
UKRAINE 
Overall Competitiveness 46 54 56 57 57 
Economic Performance 43 50 55 55 45 
Government Efficiency 48 52 56 56 58 
Business Efficiency 46 52 53 54 55 
Infrastructure 47 46 48 41 48 
Source: IMD (2012) 
The International Institute for Management Development (IMD) conducts another respected country 
competitiveness ranking. Its report includes 16-year time series from the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 
and covers 59 countries. It analyzes the facts and policies that shape the ability of a nation to create and maintain 
an environment that sustains more value creation for its enterprises and more prosperity for its people (IMD, 
2012). Table 2 demonstrates the Competitiveness Indicators Rankings of Hungary and Ukraine. Let’s pay 
attention to Ukraine’s overall competitiveness decrease from the 46th position in 2007 to the 57th position in 
2011. All competitiveness components also decreased during this period. The sharpest decrease was 
demonstrated by government and business efficiency. 
 
Figure 7 presents analyzed countries’ detailed competitiveness landscape (IMD, 2012). Numbers on this chart 
show countries’ ranking in the specific sphere – so, “the higher hills the better the competitiveness ranking”. 
According to this ranking, strong sides of Hungarian and Ukrainian competitiveness are international trade, labor 
market, and education. Again the factors which influence human capital development level (for instance 
education and labor market) are among strong points. From the other side, Ukraine has “the lowest hills” 
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of health and environment, societal framework, and management practices which are also of great 
importance for human capital development. Hungary is also relatively weak in these items. 
 
Figure 7. Competitiveness Landscape of Hungary and Ukraine in 2011 
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So, international competitiveness rankings indicate that human capital is an important factor of 
competitiveness in both Hungary and Ukraine. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) collects 
international human development indicators and calculates Human Development Index (HDI) provided in table 
3. HDI is an alternative indicator of countries’ developments which also demonstrates a broader understanding 
of peoples well-being and includes three basic dimensions of human development: health, education, and 
income. From table 3 we can see that Hungary's HDI is 0.816, which gives the country a rank of 38 out of 187 
countries (UNDP, 2012). 
 
Table 3 International Human Development Indicators of Hungary and Ukraine in 2011 
 
Area Indicator Hungary Ukraine 
Human development HDI, rank 38 76 
Human development HDI, score 0.816 0.729 
Health Life expectancy at birth (years) 74.4 68.5 
Education Education index  
(expected and mean years of schooling) 
0.866 0.858 
Income GNI per capita in PPP terms 
 (constant 2005 international $) 
16 582 6 175 
Inequality Inequality-adjusted HDI 0.759 0.662 
Poverty Multidimensional poverty index (%) 0.016 0.008 
Gender Gender Inequality Index 0.237 0.335 
Sustainability Adjusted net savings (% of GNI) 4.5 5.6 
Demography Population (thousands) 9 966 45 190 
Source: UNDP (2012) 
Ukraine takes 76th place out of 187 countries with the score 0.729. It is considered to be high in the human 
development level as the as world average HDI score was 0.682 in 2011. So, high levels of development 
characterize the human capital of both countries. Again we can see that the education index of these countries 
is almost the same and is actually rather high when compared with the other countries of the world. 
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Let us now summarize the messages of the non-GDP measurements! They have validated our preliminary 
assumptions about bottlenecks only in the case of organizational capital! Hungary and Ukraine: 
• have achieved remarkably good relative ranking positions regarding education, i.e. in the building of 
knowledge capital,  
• while regarding their institutions, or organizational capitals, they have obtained their relatively weakest 
appraisal.  
According to formal measurements, both countries have high intellectual capital performances that do not 
correspond to their economic and social performances. The question is why. That is what we would call an 
intellectual capital development paradox. But one cannot forget how we defined intellectual capital in our 
production function. In it, the organisational capital, i.e. the internal immaterial assets or capital is also the part 
of the intellectual assets or capital. So, one element of it seems to be positive, while the other one appears as a 
serious bottleneck. Behind the paradox the real question is how to implement this potential in practice; how to 
turn this bottleneck into the mainstream and a key development force of the countries’ competitiveness. 
 
7. Obstacles making knowledge capital ineffective, or idle 
 
The social transformation of Central-Eastern European countries was extremely deep and almost addressed each 
element of these societies, to examine all of them is impossible. Only through the analysis of the most important 
units and processes can success be promised. Relying on our production function, we think that the first units 
that should be examined are operated according to our production function. These units are the enterprises. 
 
We could significantly reduce the task without endangering satisfactory results if we concentrate only on the 
competitive sphere, i.e. the enterprises that are the driving force of the market economy. The manufacturing, the 
energy producing industries, the construction, the trade, and the so-called economic services all belong to this 
sphere6. This sphere does not contain the agriculture, the financial enterprises, the households, the non-profit 
institutions helping households, or the government institutions. This sphere produces around 60-70 percent of the 
GDP. The less developed a country, the larger this share. For this group of enterprises we downloaded an EU 
database which contained various data, such as the number of enterprises, the number of employed persons 
within these enterprises, the value added at factor cost produced by them, and much more.7 
 
                                                 
6
 According to EU statistics the following industries are parts of the competitive sphere: Mining and quarrying (NACE Rev.1.1 C), 
Manufacturing (NACE Rev.1.1 D), Electricity, gas and water (NACE Rev.1.1 E), Construction (NACE Rev. 1.1 F), Distributive trades 
(NACE Rev. 1.1 G), Hotels & catering (NACE Rev. 1.1 H), Transport, storage & communications (NACE Rev. 1.1 I), Real estate, renting 
& business activity (NACE Rev. 1.1 K).  
7
 The database is as follows: ANNUAL REPORT ON EUROPEAN SMEs : DATA, Exact definitions for the indicators can be found at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_SDDS/EN/sbs_esms.htm and in the below box. 
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Figure 8: The per capita GDP (PPP) and the average enterprise size 
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The first indicator that we would like to analyse for each European country and for Ukraine is the average 
enterprise size. The average enterprise size as a function of the per capita GDP (PPP) can be seen in figure 8. 
The picture is striking. The assumption, the larger the enterprise size the more efficient the country only 
partly stands true. As can be seen in the figure, when developed countries have a larger average enterprise size 
the productivity is better, but in post-socialist countries it is opposite, the larger the average enterprise size, the 
less the productivity. 
 
The rationale behind this phenomenon can be found in the transition from the centrally planned economic model 
to the market economy. In the previous socialist countries unemployment did not exist, which meant large state 
owned companies employed everyone regardless of skills, competencies, or motivation. At the same time 
economic activities in small private firms were constrained. This resulted in highly inefficient companies as 
efficiency was only ad hoc and not a system requirement. This enterprise structure we call as quasi developed 
enterprise structure. This structure seemed to be developed only in its artificial enterprises size because in 
its performance it was quite underdeveloped. Therefore we will use the ‘quasi’ adjective.  
 
If we put ownership, rivalry and competition into play, efficiency becomes a requirement. In the transition period 
the post socialist countries wear in the process of tearing down their inefficient large companies. Only those 
competitive units where the efficiency has increased remained alive. So this restructuring resulted in less 
large companies in number, but each of them became more efficient. At the same time the tearing down resulted 
in a significant decrease of average enterprise size. This is the reason why the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
and Slovenia are at the bottom of the U trend and this is also the way that the quasi-developed enterprise 
structure was broken down.  
 
The different enterprise characteristics of Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary, Ukraine, and some other counties 
of the Visegrád cooperation show the different components behind the aggregated enterprise size (table 4.). 
According to economic strength Germany could be the role model country, but, according to size and added 
value, the Netherlands should actually be the role model country for the smaller central European post-socialist 
countries. 
 
According to the data of Hungary, Ukraine, and Slovakia we see the different alternatives as to how the 
transition was realized. Slovakia did not tear down the large company size structure. On the other hand, Hungary 
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and Ukraine downsized their large companies. Ukraine is moving the same way that Hungary did. In 1991 the 
average company size in Ukraine was 25 employees per firm. In 2010 this figure reduced to 5.8 
 
Each international comparison is a timely comparison as well. The less developed countries depict the past and 
the most developed ones indicate the future. The middle developed Slovakia, by it’s extreme development path, 
also depicts the past. The U trend curve shows that the transition process probably stands somewhere in the 
middle. Past quasi-developed structures have been broken down in the majority of the post socialist 
countries and it is clear that these countries should devlop more large companies, which employ more 
people who can then add more value. The future development should increase the average enterprise size 
once again. 
 
Table 4.: Enterprise characteristics of several European countries 
 
Germany Netherl. Hungary Poland Czech R. Ukraine Slovakia
0-9 head 83,3% 89,7% 94,2% 96,1% 95,6% 71,3%
10-49 head 13,8% 8,6% 4,8% 2,7% 3,5% 25,3%
0-49 head 97,1% 98,2% 99,0% 98,8% 99,1% 93,7% 96,7%
50-249 head 2,4% 1,5% 0,8% 1,0% 0,7% 5,7% 2,6%
SMEs total 99,5% 99,7% 99,9% 99,8% 99,8% 99,4% 99,3%
Above 250 heads 0,5% 0,3% 0,1% 0,2% 0,2% 0,6% 0,7%
Enterprises total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
0-9 head 2,8 3,1 1,8 2,2 1,1 2,8
10-49 head 18,9 23,8 19,0 22,6 19,8 12,6
0-49 head 5,0 4,9 2,6 2,8 1,8 2,3 5,3
50-249 head 100,0 97,5 96,9 105,5 103,4 105,5 106,5
SMEs total 7,3 6,3 3,4 3,8 2,5 3,1 8,0
Above 250 heads 935,4 1057,2 920,1 862,4 796,0 1086,0 841,9
Enterprises total 11,9 9,2 4,7 5,7 3,8 4,9 13,8
0-9 head 133 127 16 28 19 86
10-49 head 845 1 360 287 542 439 282
0-49 head 234 235 29 43 34 12 137
50-249 head 5 731 8 695 2 075 2 787 2 472 1 201 2 402
SMEs total 366 362 46 70 52 41 197
Above 250 heads 63 327 79 998 26 389 27 147 27 162 15 110 25 664
Enterprises total 678 581 84 128 94 94 374
0-9 head 48 41 9 13 17 31
10-49 head 45 57 15 24 22 22
0-49 head 46 48 11 15 19 5 26
50-249 head 57 89 21 26 24 11 23
SMEs total 50 58 14 18 21 13 25
Above 250 heads 68 76 29 31 34 14 30
Enterprises total 57 63 18 23 25 19 27
Labour productivity (1000€ / head )
Number of enterprises in total number of enterprises (%)
Number of persons employed / number of enterprises (Head per enterprise)
Value-added at factor costs / number of enterprises (1000€ / enterprise)
 
Source: Authors’ calculation from Hungarian Statistical Office and AMECO databases 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 Iaroslava Stollachuk’s own estimates derived from enterprise databases of the Ukrainian CSO. 
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Figure 9.: Employment and Added Value in EU countries 
  
Source: Authors’ calculation from Hungarian Statistical Office and AMECO databases 
 
In figure 9, it can be seen to what point the transition countries could fare so far and what kind of typical 
performance groups exists in the EU. The net contributor countries have the highest performance in all aspects, 
namely in the average number of persons employed, in the added value per enterprise and in the GDP per capita. 
Other central countries (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, and the UK) are only a little bit behind the net 
contributors in every aspect, which clearly shows that this should be the path for development. 
 
The problem becomes visual when we look at the Southern European Periphery (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal, Spain) and the Central Eastern European Periphery (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia). This problem appears to be twofold, first the Southern European Periphery’s 
performance is so low in respect of added value, average employment, and per capita GDP, that they can not 
solve the problems of the crisis, as it can be seen in the current news; secondly, the Central Eastern European 
Periphery in its transition is clearly headed to the point where the Southern European Periphery is right now. For 
the time being, it is difficult to see how the Central-Eastern European Periphery will make a shift in its transition 
and move toward the central countries or towards the net contributors to avoid the crisis of the Southern 
Periphery from its own strength.  
 
It is quite obvious that the average enterprise size is proportional with the average value added producing ability 
of enterprises. The addition of more value can be produced only by bigger enterprises, because only the bigger 
enterprises are able to make the investments necessary for higher efficiency and higher volume. The profitability 
is strictly determined by the enterprise size. If the rejuvenation of the competitive sphere in Central and Eastern 
Europe has led to the decrease of the enterprise size, then the slowdown of the increase of income producing 
ability is inevitable. So, the rejuvenation had two effects: the structural change broke down the quasi-
developed structure and has increased the productivity this way, but at the same time it decreased the 
average enterprise size and through it withheld the increase of the income producing ability. 
 
The solution to this trap could be that the Central and Eastern European countries could strengthen their 
enterprise structure in the middle (increase the shares of small and medium companies) and slightly increase the 
share of their large companies. That would then produce a shift towards the German and Dutch enterprise 
structure. Then the larger enterprises could employ relatively more people and produce more value added, this 
shift could also improve the employment and accelerate the GDP growth (see the share data and the employment 
and productivity coefficients in table 4). Of course, a shift of this kind produces serious capital, especially 
knowledge capital requirements. 
 
By suggesting this kind of structural shift we are not going against smaller businesses. The micro and small 
enterprises, and the medium and large enterprises are equally important workshops of development of 
knowledge capital. The Slovakian economic policy, which does not take seriously enough the proper 
development of SMEs, is very risky. If the pressure for higher efficiency will drive a significant part of large 
companies into lower wage countries, then Slovakia will lack a serious amount of important knowledge that 
could be obtained only in the practice of micro and small enterprises. The larger companies need the innovations 
of micro and small enterprises are like the hungry man a slice of bread. At the same time the real innovations of 
the micro and small enterprises can be tested and turned into true inventions only in medium and large 
companies. As the German and Dutch structures show, there must be an equilibrium among the different 
company types. Small and large companies should live in harmonic, organic unity. 
 
Net 
contributors
Centrum
Other 
centrum 
countries
EU total
Southern 
European 
periphery
Periphery
Central-
Eastern 
European 
periphery
0,0
2,0
4,0
6,0
8,0
10,0
12,0
15 000 20 000 25 000 30 000 35 000 40 000
H
e
a
d
 /
 e
n
te
rp
ri
se
 -
in
 2
0
1
1
GDP per capita (PPP = at purchasing power parity, USA dollar / head) - in 2009
The per capita GDP (PPP) and the average enterprise size 
measured in employed persons
H
e
a
d
 /
 e
n
te
rp
ri
se
 -
in
 2
0
1
1
 
 
Net 
contributors
Centrum
Other 
centrum 
countriesEU total
Southern-
European 
periphery
Periphery
Central-
Eastern 
European 
periphery
0,000
0,100
0,200
0,300
0,400
0,500
0,600
0,700
15 000 20 000 25 000 30 000 35 000 40 000
M
il
li
o
n
 E
u
ro
 /
 e
n
te
rp
ri
se
 i
n
 2
0
1
1
Per capita GDP (PPP = at purchasing power parity, in US dollars) - in 2009 
Per capita GDP (PPP) and the average enterperise size 
measured in produced VA at factor cost
M
il
li
o
n
 E
u
ro
 /
 e
n
te
rp
ri
se
 i
n
 2
0
1
1
 
 
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.3, No.8, 2013 
 
79 
This relationship has obviously been distorted in Hungary in the direction of the so called necessity 
entrepreneurship (look at the very high share and very low productivity of micro companies in the Hungarian 
column of table 4). We regard an enterprise as a necessary enterprise if the struggle for survival is the reason 
why the enterprise was created and not only for the profit. If a society is unable to organize an efficient division 
of labour, then its citizens are forced to look for some money earning activities in the legal and illegal economy 
and this will never result in efficient companies. If people will only extrude into necessary entrepreneurships and 
nobody cares whether they will be able to exist in the niches of the larger ones, then their knowledge capital will 
degenerate, and turn back to the natural economy and to the lower level of division of labour. This will cause the 
development of the knowledge capital of a nation to unfold it into certain fields, but will detain it as a whole. So 
in Hungary, there is still a reserve to improve its distorted enterprise structure. When the share and the number of 
small, medium, and large companies increase, the necessary entrepreneurs will flow back into them. 
 
Ukraine should not only increase the average size of enterprises, but should also enhance their capacity to the 
European level through cardinal changes of entrepreneurship climate as well as through the improvement of 
national policy in the field of industrial innovation through development of breakthrough industries of national 
economy. This will allow the creation of essentially new conditions for SMEs development, which will orient 
their activities in line with the technical, technological, and managerial potential formed by the large enterprises 
and which are adequate to meet the world competitive challenge. In the world today, large enterprises continue 
to occupy a leading role in the general entrepreneurial system, as they became a key organizational form of 
production within which the radical innovations evolved and spread, which in turn allowed the transition to the 
new technological organization of extended creation of social production.  
 
If the enterprise structure is distorted, then the accumulated knowledge capital could be parallelized, and 
could remain idle. It is not enough to accumulate knowledge capital; it must be mobilized by an appropriate 
enterprise structure. This is a mutual relationship. A given structure requires appropriate knowledge capital, 
while given knowledge capital only allows the creation of a structure that corresponds to it. If an engineer cannot 
find a well-equipped job in a modern enterprise and must rather tinker around in a lean-to workshop, then the 
country’s good education performance indicators are in vain. The knowledge capital will remain idle and the 
economic performance will fall back. This problem will be magnified by the presence of the multinational firms. 
Having too large a share of necessary entrepreneurship has actually become a hindrance in taking part in the 
development of top products and technologies and has left this terrain to multinationals. 
 
If, in the life of a nation the most developed products and the state of the art technologies are mainly in the hand 
of the multinational capital, then one of the most important elements of knowledge capital, the spreading of 
innovations, their transformation into products, services, and procedures, disappears from the life of the country 
and only the knowledge necessary to the supplier role and the repetitive and non-innovative knowledge will be 
developed. That country that gives up the self-reliant development of top products and top technologies in mass 
production falls behind and leaves this terrain for others. If a country gives up this endeavour, then the average 
enterprise size could remain low. If not, this is what will happen, the country will, at all circumstances, create its 
pulling with large and medium enterprises that will increase the average enterprise size. 
 
What we said about multinationals does not mean that we are against multinationals! It is very important to note 
that the endeavour to get into the centre of development of top products and technologies does not mean that the 
country doing it could create only pure domestic enterprise types. The domestic capital will have less of a chance 
if it only tries to accomplish these goals alone, in complete competition with the multinational capital. Here those 
joint solutions will have a very serious role in which the share of domestic capital grows compared to the shares 
of the past, but the nature of the relationship remains within the borders of partnership. 
Conclusion 
We have analyzed the economic growth and its determining factors in countries of the European Union, 
particularly in Hungary and Ukraine. We have found that the Central-Eastern European Periphery has not 
finished its transition, and that this change is heading in the direction of the Southern Periphery of the European 
Union. As the Southern Periphery is the area of economic crises right now, it is obvious that something should 
be done in order to avoid falling to the same fate for the Central-Eastern European Periphery. We introduced a 
new production function and with its help we identified the bottlenecks of growth in Hungary and Ukraine, 
namely the organizational and human capital that, in its present development stage, do not correspond to the 
needs of creating state of the art larger companies. The present crisis pushes both countries to postpone long-
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term developments, such as investments into human capital, and in this way makes the solution of the crisis more 
difficult.  
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